When more does not necessarily mean better: Health-related illfare comparisons with non-monotone wellbeing relationships by Apablaza, M et al.
This is an author produced version of When more does not necessarily mean better: 
Health-related illfare comparisons with non-monotone wellbeing relationships.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/91585/
Article:
Apablaza, M, Bresson, F and Yalonetzky, G (2016) When more does not necessarily mean
better: Health-related illfare comparisons with non-monotone wellbeing relationships. 
Review of Income and Wealth, 62 (S1). S145-S178. ISSN 0034-6586 
https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12221
© 2015 International Association for Research in Income and Wealth. This is the peer 
reviewed version of the following article: Apablaza, M., Bresson, F. and Yalonetzky, G. 
(2016), When More Does Not Necessarily Mean Better: Health-Related Illfare 
Comparisons with Non-Monotone Well-Being Relationships. Review of Income and 
Wealth, 62: S145–S178. doi: 10.1111/roiw.12221, which has been published in final form at
https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12221. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes 
in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
When more does not necessarily mean better:
Health-related illfare comparisons with
non-monotone wellbeing relationships
Mauricio APABLAZA∗ Florent BRESSON† Gaston YALONETZKY‡
September 8, 2015
Abstract
Most welfare studies assume that wellbeing is monotonically related to the variables
used for the analysis. While this assumption is reasonable for many dimensions of well-
being like income, education, or empowerment, there are some cases where it is defini-
tively not relevant, in particular with respect to health. For instance, health status is
often proxied using the Body Mass Index (BMI). Low BMI values can capture under-
nutrition or the incidence of severe illness, yet a high BMI is neither desirable as it
indicates obesity. Usual illfare indices derived from poverty measurement are then not
appropriate. This paper proposes illfare indices that are consistent with some situa-
tions of non-monotonic wellbeing relationships and examines the partial orderings of
different distributions derived from various classes of illfare indices. An illustration is
provided for child health as proxied by a weight-for-age indicator using DHS data for
Bangladesh, Colombia and Egypt during the last few decades.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Target 1.C from the Millennium Development Goals states that the proportion of people
who suffer from hunger should be halved between 1990 and 2015. Although this objective
is unlikely to be met by 2015, the share of undernourished individuals has declined during
the period (de Onis et al., 2004, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the U. N.
Secretariat, 2012). For instance, the FAO finds that the share of undernourished people in
the developing world fell from about 20% to 15% during the period 1990-2010.1 However,
a stylized fact in most developing countries is that progresses concerning undernutrition
have often been associated with increase in obesity (Popkin et al., 2012). This so-called
nutrition transition raises the issue of a net gain in social welfare with respect to health.
Should we consider that the level of welfare in a society has improved if undernutrition
has declined but other forms of malnutrition have become more severe? If we want to
perform a global assessment of the social progress with respect to nutrition, then we need
to render the situations of underweight and overweight individuals socially comparable.
Wellbeing is generally supposed to be monotonically related to the variables used for
the analysis in poverty and welfare studies. While this assumption can be deemed rea-
sonable for many dimensions of wellbeing like income, education, or empowerment, there
are some cases where it is definitively not relevant, in particular regarding health. For
instance, health status is often proxied using the Body Mass Index (BMI) in the case of
adults,or using weight-for-age or height-for-age in the case of children and adolescents.
Low BMI values can capture undernutrition or the incidence of severe illness, yet a high
BMI is neither desirable as it indicates obesity. That is why the BMI is usually compared
against a left-tail and a right-tail cut-off which work as deprivation lines, e.g. 18.5 kg/m2
and 25 kg/m2, respectively. Estimating aggregate illfare using traditional poverty indices,
based on a unique (left-tailed) deprivation line, is therefore not appropriate. Likewise
several other health indicators are characterized by the use of two deprivation lines for
diagnostic purposes because they relate to situations in which either “having too much” or
“too little” is detrimental to health. That is the case of several blood tests, including blood
pressure, thyroid function, haemoglobin and total cholesterol.
This paper first proposes illfare indices that are consistent with situations of non-
monotonic relationships between wellbeing and its indicators, like the aforementioned
examples. These indices are decomposable into two indices that, respectively, measure
a concept of “shortfall” illfare and another one of “excess” illfare. While “shortfall” illfare is
identical to the traditional understanding of poverty as insufficiency, “excess” illfare refers
to wellbeing harmed by suboptimal abundance. The family of indices is described in terms
of its fulfillment of desirable axioms, and includes extensions of traditional poverty indices
like the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family, the Clark-Hemming-Ulph family, and the Watts
index. For the above purpose we introduce key alterations to the traditional axioms of
focus, monotonicity and transfers.
Indices provide precise and useful information as well as a complete ordering of ob-
served distributions. However, they are all based on specific underlying welfare functions
1 Figures are from the 2012 Millennium Development Goals Report (Department of Economic and Social
Affairs of the U. N. Secretariat, 2012).
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(Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980) upon which agreement may not be met. Of course, in the
health context, risks of death or severe disease may theoretically be precisely estimated
for the different values of the variable under consideration, but it is not so clear how people
value such risks in terms of wellbeing. The relationship becomes even more complex once
psychological and social aspects of health are taken into account. For these reasons, it is
necessary to look for criteria that make it possible to draw robust conclusions about the
state of illfare; that is, to obtain results that do not depend on the specific functional forms
used to assess illfare. The paper also examines the partial orderings of different distribu-
tions, according to sub-families of our class of illfare indices, by deriving the required first
and second-order stochastic dominance conditions. We also study the conditions for partial
orderings when the experience of one form of illfare (e.g. “shortfall” illfare) is considered
to be worse than the other one (e.g. “excess” illfare).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the family of
non-monotone illfare indices and its associated partial ordering conditions. The third sec-
tion proposes stochastic dominance conditions when the two forms of illfare are deemed to
have differential effects on wellbeing. Section 4 shows how to compute the standard errors
for the family of indices. The fifth section provides an empirical illustration of child health
illfare measured by a weight-for-age indicator, and using several Demographic Health Sur-
veys (DHS) from Bangladesh, Colombia and Egypt; three large developing countries in
South Asia, Latin America and North Africa, respectively. The illustration shows that
health-related illfare levels have declined during the periods of analysis for under-5 chil-
dren in all countries, but that the overall improvement is partly offset by the increase in
obesity. The paper concludes with some final remarks.
2 Non-monotone poverty measurement: The general case
2.1 Two classes of poverty indices with revised versions of the focus,
monotonicity and transfer axioms
Let x describe an individual attribute defined on the domain Ω ∶= [ω−, ω+] ⊂R. Illfare may
then be assessed using unidimensional additive poverty indices P (z) that are of the type:
P (z) ∶= ∫ z
ω−
π(x, z)dF (x), (1)
where F is the cumulative distribution function (cdf), z ∈ Ω is the poverty line, and the
continuous function π ∶ Ω ×Ω→R+ is an individual poverty index such that:
π(x, z)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if x < z,
= 0 otherwise
. (2)
Indices of the family (1) satisfy the traditional properties of continuity, anonymity, pop-
ulation replication, focus and additive decomposability. Moreover, they also comply with
weak monotonicity if ∂π
∂x
⩽ 0. In general the monotonicity axiom enjoys broad consensus
and is consistent with poverty assessments based on income.
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With indices P (z), illfare is associated with insufficient level of the variable x with
regard to a norm corresponding to z. However, the relevant space for conceptualizing
wellbeing is rarely the one where attribute x is defined. Indeed, the “failure to achieve
certain minimum capabilities” (Sen, 1985) does not systematically mean an insufficient
value for x. So, in the space of capabilities, illfare can be defined as a lack of resources but
potentially not in the space of x. Considering nutrition, a person is health-deprived if she
does not have the ability to get an adequate and balanced diet, regarding her physiological,
psychological and social needs. Causes of this inability are diverse, including for instance
low income, limited access to diversified sources of nutrients, insufficient information on
the importance of a balanced diet, severe diseases or handicaps, and mental disorders.
Whatever the precise roots of health-related illfare, we consider them to be the expression
of low capabilities.
Here we consider illfare indices that do not exhibit the same behaviour as indices (1)
because the underlying relationship between variable x and welfare is not supposed to be
monotonic. More specifically, we introduce a set of deprivation lines {zL, zU} ⊂ Ω, with
zL < zU , such that:2
π(x; zL, zU )
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if x < zL,
= 0 if x ∈ [zL, zU ]
> 0 if x > zU
, (3)
where π is also a continuous function. Hence here illfare relates to situations in which
either “having too much” or “having too little” is detrimental for individual wellbeing. We
note at the outset that such non-monotone relationship with respect to health has already
been investigated regarding health inequalities (e.g. Dutta, 2007), but, to the best of our
knowledge, no tool has yet been proposed for the social assessment of total health illfare.
At the social aggregation level, we consider illfare indices P of the type:
P (zL, zU ) ∶= ∫ zL
ω−
π(x; zL, zU )dF (x) + ∫ ω+
zU
π(x; zL, zU )dF (x). (4)
Note, firstly, that the definition of P in equation (1) can be seen as the limiting case
zU = ω+ of the definition in equation (4). Secondly, P in equation (4) does not fulfil the
traditional definitions of the focus and monotonicity axioms proposed by Sen (1976). A
poverty index complies with the focus axiom if the social poverty level does not change
when a non-poor person receives more of x. However for any individual with x ∈]zL, zU [,
there is always an increment κ > 0 such that x + κ ⩾ zU , i.e. the individual falls into illfare.
Likewise, the monotonicity axiom usually states that poverty does not increase whenever
2 Here we suppose that the same deprivation lines zL and zU can be applied for each individual within
the observed populations, and that they are exogenous with respect to the observed values of x within these
populations. The first assumption means that the same thresholds can be applied for each person whatever
her sex, age, or any other relevant characteristic. Both for illfare measurement and dominance tests, that
assumption can be relaxed, notably by rescaling observed values of x so that all group-specific deprivation lines
coincide. The second assumption implies that we are measuring absolute illfare. While this focus is reasonable
for physiological dimensions of health, it is admittedly contentious when dealing with psychological and social
aspects. For instance, we could posit that obesity becomes a more acute concern when its prevalence is rare
than when it is widespread among the population. These considerations are however left aside for future
work.
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a poor person augments her x. Nevertheless in our setting we posit that increases above
the upper deprivation line zU should not decrease illfare. These conflicts are not surprising
as the focus and monotonicity axioms are usually defined for indices in the shape of equa-
tion (1). Since the focus and monotonicity axioms express simple and desirable properties,
it is worth proposing new definitions for these axioms befitting our specific framework.
Formally:
Axiom (FOC). PA(zL, zU ) = PB(zL, zU ) if distribution B is obtained from distribution A by
adding κ ∈ R to any observed value x ∈]zL, zU [ such that x + κ ∈]zL, zU [.
Axiom (MON). PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU) if distribution B is obtained from distribution A
i) by subtracting κ > 0 to any observed value x ∈ [ω−, zL] such that x−κ ∈ Ω, or ii) by adding
κ > 0 to any observed value x ∈ [zU , ω+] such that x + κ ∈ Ω.
Axioms FOC and MON are thus defined in order to preserve the spirit underlying their
usual definitions. FOC assumes that a change in x for a non-deprived person does not
change illfare as long as the person remains outside the illfare domain. The monotonic-
ity axiom is usually defined to state that movements towards the poverty line for a poor
person do not increase poverty. That is exactly what axiom MON states for illfare. To elu-
cidate that point, let us introduce the concepts of “shortfall" illfare and “excess" illfare. The
former refers to an insufficient amount of a wellbeing attribute x, usually judged by com-
paring against the left-tail deprivation line zL. By contrast, “excess" illfare is the situation
of an excessive, and detrimental, amount of a wellbeing attribute, or indicator, e.g. the
BMI; which is determined by comparing x against the right-tail deprivation line zU . Then
our monotonicity axiom states that both a decrease in x for a “shortfall" illfare person, and
an increase in x for an “excess" illfare person do not decrease overall illfare.
We can now define the following class of non-monotone illfare indices:
Π1(zL+, zU−) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P
RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
zL ∈ [ω−, zL+], zU ∈ [zU−, ω+], zL+ ⩽ zU−
π(x; zL, zU ) ∈ Cˆ1
π(1)(x; zL, zU ) ⩽ 0, ∀x < zL, and π(1)(x; zL, zU ) ⩾ 0, ∀x > zU
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
, (5)
where π(1)(x; zL, zU ) ∶= ∂π
∂x
and Cˆs is the set of functions that are s times piecewise dif-
ferentiable on Ω. Members of Π1(zL+, zU−) fulfil FOC and MON as defined above. They
also comply with the traditional anonymity, additive decomposability, continuity and pop-
ulation replication invariance axioms. Anonymity states that x is the sole characteristic
explaining why two individuals could exhibit differing values of π. Thus, other characteris-
tics like age, household size, ethno-linguistic features, or gender, should not be considered
when assessing illfare. Additive decomposability means that overall social illfare is the
sum of individual illfare measures, a property that is desirable within our framework in
order to assess the relative contribution of “shortfall” and “excess” illfare to overall illfare.
Continuity at the deprivation line is the result of the second condition in (5), and is neces-
sary to prevent small measurement errors from producing non-marginal variations in the
estimated illfare level.3 Finally, the population invariance principle states that replicat-
ing each member of the population the same number of times does not change the level
3 Note that continuity at the deprivation line is not necessary for the design of first order stochastic condi-
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of illfare, so that population of different size can be compared in terms of illfare. Fulfil-
ment of this property requires the social illfare function to be an arithmetic average of the
individual measures.
Interesting examples of P ∈ Π1(zL+, zU−) are the following extensions of the traditional
Foster et al.’s (1984) poverty indices:
FGTβ,αL,αU (zL, zU ) ∶= ∫ zL
ω−
( zL − x
zL − ω−)
αL
dF (x) + β∫ ω+
zU
( x − zU
ω+ − zU )
αU
dF (x), (6)
with β > 0, αL ⩾ 1, and αU ⩾ 1. The family FGTβ,αL,αU also includes the headcount index for
αL = αU = 0. The headcount index is not a member of Π1(zL+, zU−), as it is not continuous
within the illfare domain; but provides useful information regarding the prevalence of
illfare within the population. β is a weighing parameter that gives more emphasis on
“shortfall” illfare for β ∈ (0,1) and on “excess” illfare for β > 1. The parameters αL and αU
regulate the index’s sensitivity to extreme forms of deprivation. Likewise, we can easily
propose extensions to other traditional poverty indices, e.g. the Watts, or those from the
Clark-Hemming-Ulph family.
These indices are relative indices as the size of individual shortfalls or excesses is
normalized by the corresponding value for the maximum shortfall or excess, respectively.
Alternatively, one may use, for instance, the following absolute version of the FGTβ,αL,αU :
FGTAβ,αL,αU (zL, zU ) ∶= ∫ z
L
ω−
(zL − x)αL dF (x) + β∫ ω+
zU
(x − zU)αU dF (x), (7)
with αL ⩾ 0 and αU ⩾ 0.
Here we note that Jolliffe (2004) proposed a measure of the social burden of overweight
related to the Foster et al.’s (1984) family of poverty indices. More specifically, using our
own notations, the proposed measure was:
OWαU (zU) ∶= ∫ ω+
zU
(x − zU
zU
)αU dF (x). (8)
Of course, indices OWαU differs from FGTβ,αL,αU as the former only considers over-
weight. But also the normalization of “excesses” is also performed differently between the
two families: While “excesses” are normalized by the threshold zU in OWαU , FGTβ,αL,αU
uses the maximum “excess” ω+ − zU . Therefore the two families may not provide the same
ordering of “excess” illfare for αU ⩾ 2. Moreover, our normalization approach is more appro-
priate for comparability purposes between “loss” and “excess” illfare, since normalization
by the reference thresholds would result in relatively lower relative gaps in the “excess” do-
main as they would be associated with a larger threshold. Finally, indices from FGTβ,αL,αU
fulfil an additional property of translation invariance, whereby the illfare level is left un-
changed after incrementing each value x, the bounds ω− and ω+, and the thresholds zL
and zU by the same amount.
tions. Consequently, the conditions expressed below in Proposition 1 could also be applied to a broader class
of illfare indices that may not respect continuity at the deprivation line. On the other hand, continuity is
desirable for second order dominance conditions. On this specific point for poverty analysis, see for instance
Zheng (1999) and Araar and Duclos (2006).
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The index OWαU (zU )was also proposed as a measure of richness by Peichl et al. (2010).
The authors also introduced concave indices (with αU ∈]0; 1[) that do not fit our framework
regarding the effects of progressive transfers (see below).
Following Sen (1976) we may prefer illfare indices to be sensitive to inequalities be-
tween those individuals experiencing illfare situations. Such distribution-sensitive indices
usually comply with a transfer axiom stating that progressive transfers between two in-
dividuals in illfare should decrease, or at least not increase, the illfare level.4 However,
it is worth noting that, contrary to indices of the type (1), Pigou-Dalton transfers within
our framework have to be considered over a non-convex set since the illfare domain is
defined by the union of non-contiguous intervals. Consequently, we may consider three
cases: i) when both people are experiencing “shortfall” illfare; ii) when both are in “excess”
illfare; and iii) when the two persons belong to these different groups. The first two cases
can be handled just like rank-preserving progressive transfers in the traditional poverty
literature (i.e. based on (1)). In the third case, a transfer from the “excess” illfare person
to the “shortfall” illfare person means wellbeing improvements for both people, therefore
it can be addressed using MON. Hence the apparent inability of our transfer axiom to deal
with transfers between any pair of individuals in illfare situations is not a a matter of
concern, since our illfare indices comply with MON.
The transfer axiom can thus be presented in the following manner:
Axiom (TRA). PA(zL, zU ) ⩾ PB(zL, zU ) if distribution B is obtained from distribution A by
transferring κ > 0 from individual i to individual j such that {xi, xj} ⊂ [ω−, zL] or {xi, xj} ⊂[zU , ω+], and ∣xi − xj ∣ ⩾ ∣(xi − κ) − (xj + κ)∣.5
Note that members from the class FGTβ,αL,αU (zL, zU ) respect this transfer axiom only
for αL ⩾ 1 and αU ⩾ 1.
If we want illfare not to increase in the aftermath of Pigou-Dalton transfers, then we
can consider the following class of indices satisfying TRA:
Π2 (zL+, zU−) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩P ∈ Π
1(zL+, zU−) RRRRRRRRRRR
π (x; zL, zU) ∈ Cˆ2
π(2) (x; zL, zU) ⩾ 0, ∀x ∈ Ω
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ , (9)
where π(2) (x; zL, zU) ∶= ∂2π
(∂x)2
. The first condition is a technical requirement for the deriva-
tion of dominance conditions since it ensures second-order derivatives of π exists for most
value of x ∈ Ω. The second condition in (9) captures the requirement regarding the sensitiv-
ity of the social poverty function to progressive transfers. In formal terms, the additivity of
P associated with the second condition in (9) means that members from Π2 (zL+, zU−) are
S-convex in “shortfall” illfare values of x and also S-convex in “excess” illfare values of x.
Both conditions mean finally that the marginal gain in the improvement of the situation
of a person in illfare decreases and tends to zero as she moves closer to her deprivation
4Admittedly, some wellbeing outcomes, e.g. those pertaining to health, are not easily transferrable in the
way income is. So the concept of "transfers" is used only figuratively in these cases of illfare, as it is still
useful to assess sensitivity to inequality between individuals experiencing illfare situations. We thank an
anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
5TRA could alternatively be introduced in a strong sense, in which case we would state that: PA(zL, zU) >
PB(zL, zU) if distribution B is obtained from distribution A by transferring κ > 0 from individual i to individ-
ual j such that {xi, xj} ⊂ [ω−, zL] or {xi, xj} ⊂ [zU , ω+], and ∣xi − xj ∣ > ∣(xi − κ) − (xj + κ)∣
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line. It can be regarded as a desirable property as it rewards policy efforts focused on
individuals experiencing severe “shortfalls” or “excesses.”
2.2 Partial orderings
The limited set of conditions expressed for the definition of the classes Π1 (zL+, zU−) and
Π2 (zL+, zU−) leaves the door open for a wide variety of illfare indices; modified FGT indices
are only suggestions of appropriate indices within our non-monotone framework. In the
following paragraphs, we derive full robustness conditions for ordinal illfare comparisons
based on stochastic dominance conditions; that is, results that do not hinge on specific
indices or deprivation lines choices. We first propose a set of criteria for the class of illfare
measures Π1.
Proposition 1.
PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU )∀P ∈ Π1(zL+, zU−) (10)
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (11)
and F
A(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈]zU−, ω+], (12)
where F (z) ≡ Pr[x ⩾ z] = 1 − F (z) is the survival function.
Proof. See appendix A.1 ∎
The first-order dominance relationship presented in Proposition 1 states that illfare
in distribution A is not higher than in distribution B if the value of the “shortfall” illfare
headcount index is never larger for distribution A for each value of the deprivation line
within the largest admissible “shortfall” illfare domain [ω−, zL+], and if the “excess” illfare
headcount is never higher in A for each deprivation line within the largest admissible
“excess” illfare domain [zU−, ω+]. To illustrate numerically the conditions in Proposition 1,
let us consider distributions A ∶= (1,4,6,9,12, 14) and B ∶= (1,4,7,8,13, 14), and assume
zL+ = 5 and zU− = 10. Using Proposition 1, it can easily be seen that distribution A never
shows more illfare than distributionB for all indices inΠ1 and all pairs of deprivation lines{zL, zU} /⊂ (zL+, zU−) since FA(x) = FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−,5] ∪ [10,12[∪[13, ω+] but FA(x) > FB(x)
∀x ∈ [12,13[.
Strictly speaking, conditions (11) and (12) could be checked over their whole poverty
subdomains, i.e. [ω−, zL+] and [zU−, ω+], respectively, only if the cumulative and survival
functions are deemed continuous. This is the standard practice in several seminal pa-
pers in the poverty dominance literature including Atkinson (1987, 1992), and Duclos and
Makdissi (2004). However, in situations like our numerical example we have cumulative
and survival functions which are, in fact, discontinuous, step functions. Therefore, in these
cases, it is easy to show that condition (11) should hold for all x ∈ [ω−, zL+[, while condition
(12) should hold for all x ∈]zU−, ω+]. Note that a similar remark, pertaining to whether
and when the conditions may be checked in the deprivation lines, also applies to the con-
ditions in propositions (3), (5), and (7) below. Considering restricted continuity instead
of continuity, that is leaving the door open for the use of indices that are likely to show
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discontinuities at thresholds zL or zU , would also make it necessary to check inequalities
(11) and (12) at zL+ and zU−, respectively.
It is worth noting that corollary results ensue directly from Proposition 1. Let x be
a vector of values for the variable x and #(x) be the number of elements of x. Then, it
can easily be checked that there is a first-order dominance relationship between A and B
∀P ∈ Π1(zL+, zU−) if ∃xˆ ∈]zL+, zU−[#(xˆ) such that FA and FB cross only at the sole values in
xˆ and #(xˆ) is an odd number. Considering our framework, dominance relationships can
be observed with any odd number of crossings as long as they happen outside the illfare
domain. In the same spirit, if zL+ = zU− = z˜, distribution A dominates distribution B at
the first order ∀P ∈ Π1(zL+, zU−) if and only if FA and FB cross only once and at z˜. In
the case of a single crossing, this second corollary result states that the crossing value is
not necessarily the average value of x but can be any other value that is consistent with
admissible definitions of the maximum illfare domain.
Proposition 1 is reminiscent of famous results from the literature on risk (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970) and inequality (Atkinson, 1970) measurement as the distribution that
shows more illfare also exhibits more weight at the tails of its distribution. However,
corollary results show that our dominance conditions are less restrictive since risk and
inequality dominance conditions are defined for the distributions of the variable x after
normalization with respect to the mean, or for distributions with the same mean. On the
other hand, risk and inequality usual dominance conditions allow for crossings within the
illfare domain. The linkages with second-order dominance tests will be investigated in the
next paragraphs.
The familiarized reader will note that condition (12) is related to the first-degree afflu-
ence ordering of Michelangeli et al. (2011). These authors also proposed a second degree
affluence ordering corresponding to condition (15) in Proposition 2. Nevertheless our paper
differs from Michelangeli et al. (2011) since the authors do not consider the joint burden of
having individuals that have too little and individuals that have too much as they focus on
affluence. Moreover, in our framework “excess” is regarded as a social bad while it seems
that affluence is regarded as a social good by Michelangeli et al. (2011).
Proposition 1 only provides a partial ordering for any pair of distributions defined on
the domain Ω. In other words, the results with empirical implementations of the test are
likely to be non-conclusive for a significant portion of the performed comparisons as it
is possible to observe crossings of the cumulative distribution functions within the illfare
domain. Hence it can be useful to add restrictions regarding the behaviour of illfare indices
in terms of their sensitivity to progressive transfers, and then focus on members of the
subclass Π2.
The conditions for subclass Π2 entail manipulating two different functions that ac-
cumulate gaps from the boundaries of the domain of x, yielding integrals of cumulative
distribution and survival functions respectively. Let G(z) ∶= ∫ zω− F (x)dx = ∫ zω−(z − x)dF (x)
andG(z) ∶= ∫ ω+z F (x)dx = ∫ ω+z (x−z)dF (x). The function G(z) is known in the literature on
poverty and wellbeing dominance as the absolute poverty gap index, and gives the mean
value of the censored gapsmax{0, z−x} observed in the population. The function G(z) does
not average shortfalls but excesses with respect to the value z, that is max{0, x − z}. Then
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we show:
Proposition 2.
PA (zL, zU) ⩽ PB (zL, zU)∀P ∈ Π2 (zL+, zU−) (13)
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (14)
and G
A(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [zU−, ω+]. (15)
Proof. See appendix A.2 ∎
The first part of the conditions presented in Proposition 2 is identical to the one sug-
gested in Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks (1988): for each value of x below zL+
the value of the absolute poverty gap index should never be larger for population A than
for population B. The second part considers the cumulative “excesses” and states that for
illfare not to be higher in population A, the value of the average excesses should be lower
for population A than for population B, for every value of x above the upper deprivation
line zU−.
Finally, since we are dealing with additively decomposable illfare indices, we may dis-
tinguish two parts in the overall illfare level, that is the one corresponding to the presence
of individuals within the bottom part of the illfare domain [ω−, zL] and the one correspond-
ing to those people whose value of x is above the upper deprivation line zU . Overall illfare
is consequently the sum of “shortfall” and “excess” illfare. Therefore we can focus on each
group separately and then use only the corresponding condition in Propositions 1 and 2 to
check whether a robust ordering can be obtained for the sole “shortfall” (“excess”) illfare
component when comparing two distributions. Using the example of distributions A and
B in page 8, we can see that both populations show the same level of “shortfall” illfare but
that “excess” illfare is robustly larger in population B.
3 The case of comparable deprivations
“Shortfall” and “excess” illfare may be due to different causes, and result in contrasted
forms of wellbeing shortfalls. Yet we might feel sometimes that both types do not deserve
the same attention when estimating overall illfare. However, no a priori ordering of the
situation of a “shortfall” illfare person and an “excess” illfare person can be performed
directly as both people exhibit different values for the attribute x. In order to enhance
the comparability of the two illfare situations, it is thus useful to move from variable x to
a common space. Let assume that there is a strictly decreasing and continuous function
g ∶ [zU , a] → [ω−, zL] that makes values in the “excess” domain below a directly comparable
with values in the “loss” domain. Then the ordering power of the previous stochastic
dominance tests can be enhanced by assuming that the sign of π(g(x); zL, zU)−π(x; zL, zU)
does not change ∀x ∈ [zU , a]. Of course, many rival functional forms can be proposed for
g and the appropriate form is very likely to rely on the chosen wellbeing attribute. In the
present paper we will consider two intuitive functional forms but it is worth noting that
the next propositions can easily be adapted for the use of different functional forms for g.
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As in Fisher and Spencer (1992) and Lambert and Zoli (2012), it may first be worth
considering indices defined with respect to distances (gaps) from the closest reference line
for each individual, and then bring in additional assumptions regarding the relative size
of well-being losses for individuals with different characteristics albeit showing the same
gap. Let the absolute gap δ ∈R+ be defined as:
δ ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
zL − x if x < zL
0 if x ∈ [zL, zU ]
x − zU if x > zU
. (16)
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
Figure 1 shows the situation of two individuals, one is a “shortfall” illfare person with
x = a and the other one is an “excess” illfare person with x = b. As the figure shows, both
individuals exhibit the same absolute gap δ. That is why: b = zL + zU − a. However, if we
assume that the situation of the “excess” illfare person cannot be regarded as severe as the
situation of the “shortfall” illfare person, then we should obtain π (a; zL, zU) ⩾ π (b; zL, zU).
If this behaviour is deemed reasonable for every potential value of δ, that is, given x ⩽ zL
for all {x, zL + zU − x} ⊂ Ω, we can then consider the following subclass of illfare indices:
Π˜1(zL+, zU−) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩P
RRRRRRRRRRR
P ∈ Π1(zL+, zU−)∣π(1)(x, zL, zU )∣ ⩾ π(1)(zL + zU− x, zL, zU ) ∀x ⩽ zL s.t. {x, zL + zU− x} ⊂ Ω
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
(17)
The first condition in (17) states that members from Π˜1(zL+, zU−) comply with the prop-
erties of indices from Π1(zL+, zU−). The second condition defines the specificity of these
indices, stating that the marginal gain from improving the situation of an “excess” illfare
person is never greater than the marginal gain for a “shortfall” illfare person with the
same gap. It can easily be noted that, in conjunction with positing a zero poverty level
at the deprivation lines, our additional assumption on the first-order derivatives of π im-
plies π (x; zL, zU) ⩾ π (zL + zU− x; zL, zU).Members of Π˜1(zL+, zU−) include, for instance, the
indices FGTAβ,αL,αU (zL, zU ) for which β ∈ (0,1) and αL = αU .
Considering different groups of individuals in a way that yields different individual ill-
fare assessments for a given gap is not a new idea. Indeed, our framework is reminiscent of
the literature on monetary poverty comparisons with differences in needs associated with
particular attributes of individuals, e.g. their household sizes (Bourguignon, 1989, Atkin-
son, 1992, Jenkins and Lambert, 1993, Chambaz and Maurin, 1998, Duclos and Makdissi,
2005, Lambert and Zoli, 2012). These studies show that the ordering power of stochas-
tic dominance procedures can be increased when simple assumptions are made about the
difference between the individual poverty indices corresponding to two different groups.
Here, we suggest that, in many cases, a similar assumption can be made regarding the
situation of the “shortfall” and the “excess” illfare persons.
Up to now, we have considered social illfare indices whose individual indices are based
on absolute deviations from the deprivation lines. However, a usual practice is to quantify
deprivations with relative gaps, e.g. as in the family of measures proposed in equation (6).
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That is, we can use δr such that:
δr ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
zL−x
zL−ω−
if x < zL
0 if x ∈ [zL, zU ]
x−zU
ω+−zU
if x > zU
. (18)
If comparability of the two forms of illfare is based on relative gaps, then we must
consider the following subclass of illfare indices:
Π˜1r(zL+, zU−) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩P
RRRRRRRRRRRR
P ∈ Π1(zL+, zU−)∣π(1)(x, zL, zU )∣ ⩾ π(1) (zU + zL−x
zL−ω−
(ω+ − zU ), zL, zU) ∀x ⩽ zL
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ . (19)
In principle, when zL − ω− = ω+ − zU , illfare comparisons are not affected by a change
from absolute gaps to relative gaps. However, in other cases like the one in Figure 1, such
a change affects illfare orderings when additional assumptions are made regarding the
relative contribution of “shortfall” and “excess” illfare to overall illfare. Using relative gaps
δr, instead of absolute gaps δ, when performing the first-order and second-order dominance
checks described in Proposition 1 and 2, does not change the results. Yet different results
may ensue for the propositions introduced in the next pages since relative gaps do not
correspond to the same values of absolute gaps when zL−ω− ≠ ω+−zU . Moreover, dominance
results with relative gaps are likely to be contingent upon the choices for the values of ω−
and/or ω+.
3.1 Linked deprivation lines
It is worth stressing that, for a “shortfall” value a and an “excess” value b to be directly com-
parable, both should show the same distance δ or δr from their respective deprivation line.
This point is important because stochastic dominance is often performed in order to check
the robustness of comparisons to changes in deprivation lines. However, when consider-
ing gap dominance relationships, each couple (zL, zU ) defines all the pairwise comparable
values a and b within the “shortfall” and “excess” illfare domains. For instance, increasing
zL by κ (κ ∈R+ with κ < zU − zL) while leaving zU unchanged implies that the absolute gap
δ = x2 − zU does not make x2 directly comparable with x1 but with x1 +κ. Consequently, re-
sults obtained when comparing distributions A and B with the vector of deprivation lines(zL, zU ) may not hold when using the vector (zL + κ, zU ) as the latter refers to different
sets of pairwise comparable values of the wellbeing attribute.
On the other hand, if zL is increased by a given quantity κ and zU decreased by the
same amount (with, of course, 2κ < zU − zL), the value of the gap for a and b would raise by
the same amount. Therefore the resulting absolute gap δ +κ would still be associated with
the same values of x, thereby leaving the correspondences between the “shortfall” illfare
and “excess” illfare domains unchanged. With the assumption that a “shortfall” never
yields less illfare than the corresponding “excess” given δ, one can consider the fulfilment
of the following conditions in order to ensure ethically robust orderings for any members
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of the class Π˜1 of illfare indices:6
Proposition 3.
a) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜1(zL+, zU−), zL+−zL = zU−zU− = κ, and κ ∈ [0,min{zL+−
ω−, ω+ − zU−}[
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (20)
and F
A(x) + FA(zL+ + zU−− x) ⩽ FB(x) +FB(zL+ + zU−− x) ∀x ∈]zU−, ω+]. (21)
b) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜1r(zL+, zU−), zL+−zLzL+−ω− = zU−zU−ω+−zU− = κ ∈ [0,1[
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (22)
and F
A(x) + FA (zL+ − x − zU−
ω+ − zU− (zL − ω−)) ⩽ FB(x) + FB (zL+ − x − z
U−
ω+ − zU− (zL − ω−))
∀x ∈]zU−, ω+]. (23)
Proof. See appendix B.1. ∎
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Proposition 3 is a sequential dominance criterion in the spirit of those proposed in
the aforementioned studies (in particular, the part on absolute gaps bears resemblance
to proposition 1(i) of Lambert and Zoli (2012)). First, condition (20) is the same as in
Proposition 1 and states that the share of the population that experiences “shortfall” ill-
fare, i.e. the neediest group, should be lower in population A than in B at each value of
x ⩽ zL+, for illfare to be lower in the former population. The second condition does not make
any difference between “shortfall” and “excess” gaps since both are brought together for a
comparison of the cdf of gaps for each possible value of δ or δr within the illfare domain
(expressed in terms of gaps). Figure 2 illustrates these conditions when comparability is
assumed using absolute gaps. An interesting feature of the subclasses Π˜1 and Π˜1r is that
a relatively worsening outlook regarding “excess” illfare can be compensated by relatively
positive trends regarding the “shortfall” illfare people.
Let us illustrate that point with another example. Consider now distributions A ∶=(1,4,8,8,12) and B ∶= (1,2,7,7,11), still with zL+ = 5 and zU− = 10. It can easily be seen
that Proposition 1 does not hold since A exhibits less “shortfall” illfare than B but more
“excess” illfare. However, if we suppose that a given absolute gap δ yields more intense
forms of illfare in the “shortfall” domain than in the “excess” domain, the two distributions
can be ordered. Condition (20) is satisfied for each observed gap in the “shortfall” illfare
domain. For the second condition, disregarding the nature of the gaps, we respectively
obtain the following vectors of gaps (0,0,1,2,4) and (0,0,1,3,4) and it can then be seen that
F
A(x)+FA(5+10−x) = FB(x)+FB(5+10−x) ∀x ∈ [10,12]∪]13, ω+], but FA(x)+FA(5+10−x) <
F
B(x) + FB(5 + 10 − x) ∀x ∈]12,13], so that condition (21) is also respected and we can
6 A similar assumption is made in Lambert and Zoli (2012) for income poverty comparisons with group-
specific poverty lines. As the authors consider gap-dominance relationships, they investigate the case of
shifting all group-specific poverty lines up by the same amount.
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conclude that A exhibits less illfare than B. It is also important to stress that the ordering
is left intact if the lower and upper deprivation lines are respectively decreased and raised
by the same amount. For instance, if zL = zL+−1 and zU = zU−+1, we obtain the two vectors
of gaps (0,0,0,1,3) and (0,0,0,2,3) and it can be seen that A still shows less illfare than
distribution B whatever the precise functional form of P within Π˜1(zL+, zU−).
It is worth noting that the sequential dominance conditions expressed in Proposition 3
differ from those proposed in the sequential dominance literature (a notable exception is
Bourguignon, 1989) as the illfare domain for the neediest group is not necessarily larger
than the one for the less needy group. Indeed, if zL+−ω− ⩽ ω+−zU−, the size of the absolute
gaps can be larger within the “excess” illfare domain than within the “shortfall” illfare
domain, so that for values of x ∈]zL+ + zU− − ω−, ω+] it is not possible for “shortfall” illfare
situations to compensate for “excess” illfare situations in condition (21).
As with the class of illfare indices Π1, we can also assume that indices from Π2 are
more averse to inequality at the bottom of the distribution than at its upper tail. We then
consider the classes Π˜2 and Π˜2r such that:
Π˜2(zL+, zU−) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩P
RRRRRRRRRRR
P ∈ Π˜1(zL+, zU−) ∩Π2(zL+, zU−)
π(2)(x, zL, zU ) ⩾ π(2)(zL + zU− x, zL, zU ) ∀x ⩽ zL s.t. {x, zL + zU− x} ⊂ Ω
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ,
(24)
Π˜2r(zL+, zU−) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩P
RRRRRRRRRRRR
P ∈ Π˜1r(zL+, zU−) ∩Π2(zL+, zU−)
π(2)(x, zL, zU ) ⩾ π(2) (zU + zL−x
zL−ω−
(ω+ − zU), zL, zU ,) ∀x ⩽ zL
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ . (25)
The first condition in (24) (in (25)) states that members from Π˜2(zL+, zU−) (Π˜2r(zL+, zU−))
form a common subclass of both Π˜1(zL+, zU−) (Π˜1r(zL+, zU−)) and Π2(zL+, zU−). The second
line in (24) and (25) states that the marginal gains from improving the situation of a
“shortfall” illfare person decrease more rapidly than for the “excess” illfare people. The
corresponding dominance criteria for the two classes of illfare indices are:
Proposition 4.
a) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜2(zL+, zU−), zL+ − zL = zU − zU− = κ, and κ ∈[0,min{zL+ − ω−, ω+ − zU−}[
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (26)
and G
A(x) +GA(zL+ + zU−− x) ⩽ GB(x) +GB(zL+ + zU−− x) ∀x ∈ [zU−, ω+]. (27)
b) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜2r(zL+, zU−), zL+−zLzL+−ω− = zU−zU−ω+−zU− = κ ∈ [0,1[
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (28)
and G
A(x) +GA (zL+ − x − zU−
ω+ − zU− (zL − ω−)) ⩽ GB(x) +GB (zL+ − x − z
U−
ω+ − zU− (zL − ω−))
∀x ∈ [zU−, ω+]. (29)
Proof. See appendix B.2. ∎
Here we also note the resemblance between the first part of proposition 4 and proposi-
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tion 1(ii) in Lambert and Zoli (2012).
3.2 Independent deprivation lines
While Propositions 3 and 4 allow for a large set of choices for the deprivation lines (zL, zU ),
we may feel that the conditions linking zL and zU , given zL+ and zU−, are too restrictive,
since they do not make it possible to choose freely the vector of deprivation lines within
some set [zL−, zL+]× [zU−, zU+] of admissible pairs of deprivation lines. If one desires to get
such flexibility, it is then necessary to consider the following propositions:
Proposition 5.
a) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜1(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (30)
and F
A(x) +FA(zL + zU− x) ⩽ FB(x) + FB(zL + zU− x) (31)
∀x ∈]zU , ω+], zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+].
b) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜1r(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (32)
and F
A(x) + FA (zL − x − zU
ω+ − zU (zL − ω−)) ⩽ FB(x) +FB (zL − x − z
U
ω+ − zU (zL − ω−)) (33)
∀x ∈]zU , ω+], zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+].
Proposition 6.
a) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜2(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (34)
and G
A(x) +GA(zL + zU− x) ⩽ GB(x) +GB(zL + zU− x) (35)
∀x ∈ [zU , ω+], zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+].
b) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜2r(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (36)
and G
A(x) +GA (zL − x − zU
ω+ − zU (zL − ω−)) ⩽ GB(x) +GB (zL − x − z
U
ω+ − zU (zL − ω−)) (37)
∀x ∈ [zU , ω+], zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+].
Proof. See appendices B.1 and B.2. ∎
While these latter Propositions provide more robust conditions than those given by
Propositions 3 and 4, it is easy to realize that they are computationally intensive. From a
practical point of view, note that, since Propositions 5 and 6 are generalizations of Propo-
sitions 3 and 4, respectively, the conditions in the former will never be met if those in the
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latter are not fulfilled. Hence checking first the easily implementable conditions (20) and
(21), is advisable.
It is worth stressing that Propositions 5 and 6 are generalizations of Propositions 3
and 4 only in very specific cases (for instance it is required zL− = ω− and zU+ = ω+), because
the corresponding sets of poverty lines are generally not nested. However, we argue that
Propositions 5 and 6 are “more robust” from an ethical point of view because they are more
flexible regarding the choice of the poverty lines.
For absolute gaps, Lambert and Zoli (2005) have also derived similar conditions in
which group-specific poverty lines vary independently in non-overlapping ranges, but in
the different conceptual framework of monotonic poverty and several groups with different
needs.
That said, conditions (31) and (35) can also be expressed in a different manner that
renders their implementation more manageable, in the spirit of Bourguignon (1989). Let
ϕ1(x) be the maximum value of the difference FA(y) − FB(y) for a given value of x ∈[zU−, ω+] where y denotes the value of the wellbeing attribute that exhibits the same abso-
lute gap within the “shortfall” illfare domain as x does within the “excess” illfare domain,
that is:
ϕ1(x) = max
y∈Λ(x)
FA(y) − FB(y), (38)
where Λ(x) = [max{ω−, zL− + zU− −x}, zL+ −max{0, x− zU+}] is the part of the “loss” domain
where the counterpart of the “excess” value x is likely to be found given the chosen bounds
for the two deprivation lines (a detailed explanation of the derivation of Λ(x) can be found
in Appendix B.3.1). In the same spirit, we define ϕ2(x) as:
ϕ2(x) = max
y∈Λ(x)
∫
y
ω−
FA(t) − FB(t)dt. (39)
Finally, let ϕrk(x), k = 1,2, be the counterpart of ϕk(x) with relative gaps. The sole
difference with respect to the expressions given in equations (38) and (39) is that Λ(x)
is replaced by Λr(x) = [zL− + zU−−x
ω+−zU−
(zL− − ω−), zL+ +min{0, zU+−x
ω+−zU+
(zL+ − ω−)}] (a detailed
explanation of the derivation of Λr(x) can be found in Appendix B.3.2).
Propositions 5 and 6 can then be alternatively expressed as:
Proposition 7.
a) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜1(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (40)
and F
A(x) − FB(x) + ϕ1(x) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈]zU−, ω+]. (41)
b) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜1r(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff FA(x) ⩽ FB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+[ (42)
and F
A(x) − FB(x) + ϕr1(x) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈]zU−, ω+]. (43)
Proposition 8.
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a) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜2(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (44)
and G
A(x) −GB(x) + ϕ2(x) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈ [zU−, ω+]. (45)
b) PA(zL, zU ) ⩽ PB(zL, zU ) ∀P ∈ Π˜2r(zL+, zU−), zL ∈ [zL−, zL+], and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+]
iff GA(x) ⩽ GB(x) ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL+] (46)
and G
A(x) −GB(x) + ϕr2(x) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈ [zU−, ω+]. (47)
Proof. See appendix B.3. ∎
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 7. The upper part illustrates the first step of the pro-
cedure. The curve plots the difference FA(x) −FB(x) over the maximum “shortfall” illfare
domain. Condition (40) is fulfilled since the curve systematically returns negative values
over the interval [ω−, zL+]. Both the lower and upper panels are needed for the second
step of the procedure. The dashed curve represents the difference F
A(x) −FB(x) over the
maximum “excess” illfare domain. As condition (40) is respected, ϕ1(x) is non-positive and
condition (41) will necessarily be satisfied when the dashed curve is below the horizontal
line. So, condition (41) could possibly not be respected when the dashed curve is above
the horizontal lines, that is for values of x ∈ (u, v). Then for each value a within this in-
terval, we first look at the corresponding interval Λ(a) in the “shortfall” illfare domain
and consider the values of FA(x) − FB(x) for each value within Λ(a). The largest value
corresponds to ϕ1(a) and is added to FA(x) − FB(x) in the lower panel. The continuous
black curve in the lower part of Figure 3 thus plots F
A(x) − FB(x) + ϕ1(x) for each value
within the maximum “excess” illfare domain and it can be seen that condition (41) is ful-
filled since the curve is always below the zero horizontal line. Therefore we conclude that
there is more illfare in distribution B than in distribution A, according to any members of
Π˜1(zL+, zU−).
We now illustrate the proposed algorithmwith a simple example. Let (ω−, zL−, zL+, zU−, zU+, ω+) =(0,8,10,15,20, 30), A = (3,9,12,12,12, 12, 17,18), and B = (1,1,2,8,12,12, 16, 24). We can ob-
serve that condition (11) is fulfilled ∀x ∈ [0,10], but (12) does not hold for x ∈]16,17] so
that Proposition 1 does not hold. Since condition (21) is met (Proposition 3a can thus be
applied), it is worth considering condition (41). As F
A(x) − FB(x) > 0 only for x ∈]16,17]
it is not necessary compute ϕ1(x) for values outside this interval. For values of x within]16,17] it can be checked that we have to look for the highest value of FA(x)−FB(x) within
⋃x∈]16,17]Λ(x) = Λ(17) = [6,10[. We then find (FA(17) −FB(17)) +ϕ1(17) = 18 − 28 < 0. Condi-
tion (41) is thereby satisfied since ∆F (x) +ϕ1(x) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈]15,30]. Hence we can argue that
illfare in population A is never above B according to any illfare index from Π˜1(zL+, zU−)
and pair of deprivation lines within the subset [8,10] × [15,20].
Finally, note that the power of Propositions 7 and 8 depends heavily on the chosen
values for the minimum and maximum deprivation lines. In particular, as the probability
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of satisfying condition (41) depends on the width of Λ(x), the ordering power of the two
propositions should decrease as the ranges for zL and zU increase. For instance, in our
last example, we observed Λ(21) = [2,9] for zL ∈ [8,10] and zU ∈ [15,20]. With zL ∈ [9,10]
and zU ∈ [15,17], Λ(21) would have shrunk to [3,6], effectively decreasing the probability
of obtaining F
A(21) − FB(21) + ϕ1(21) > 0.
4 Statistical inference
In empirical applications we estimate the following discrete counterpart of equation (4):
P (zL, zU ) = 1
N
N
∑
n=1
π(xn, zL, zU ), (48)
where N is the sample size and xn is the value of x for individual n. Now, generally
the functions π are likely to be different for “shortfall” and “excess” illfare, just as in the
example of (6). Hence we can write equation (48) as the sum of two distinct functions π,
each multiplied by illfare identification functions:
P (zL, zU ) = 1
N
N
∑
n=1
[π(xn, zL, zU )I(xn ⩽ zL)] + 1
N
N
∑
n=1
[π(xn, zL, zU )I(xn ⩾ zU)], (49)
where I(test) is an identification function returning 1 if test is fulfilled and 0 otherwise.
Now the standard error corresponding to expression (49) of P is going to depend on the
standard errors of the two averages on the right-hand side, i.e. σˆL and σˆU , plus a negative
covariance term. This covariance is negative because whenever xn ⩽ zL then it is not the
case that xn ⩾ zU , and vice-versa. After some straightforward manipulations the variance
of P is thus:
V (P ) = σˆ2L + σˆ2U − 2PLPU
N
, (50)
where:
PL ∶= 1
N
N
∑
n=1
[π(xn, zL, zU )I(xn ⩽ zL)], (51)
PU ∶= 1
N
N
∑
n=1
[π(xn, zL, zU )I(xn ⩾ zU)], (52)
σˆ2L ∶= 1N (
N
∑
n=1
π(xn, zL, zU )2I(xn ⩽ zL)) −P 2L, (53)
σˆ2U ∶= 1N (
N
∑
n=1
π(xn, zL, zU )2I(xn ⩾ zU )) −P 2U . (54)
The formulas can easily be adjusted to account for complex survey design (see for in-
stance Deaton, 1997).
In order to test the stochastic dominance conditions derived above, we follow the testing
procedures proposed in Kaur et al. (1994), Davidson and Duclos (2000) and Davidson and
Duclos (2012) since they are based on rival hypotheses that make it possible to conclude
in a statistically robust manner whether a distribution dominates another one for a given
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order of dominance. Basically, the test consists in a first step to oppose for each value of x
within the illfare domain the following hypothesis:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
H0 ∶∆S(x) = 0,
H1 ∶∆S(x) < 0. (55)
where ∆S(x) is the considered criterion, for instance ∆S(x) = FA(x) − FB(x) in the case
of condition (11) in Proposition 1. Non-dominance of distribution A over distribution B
occurs when H0 cannot be rejected. Since the functions used for the dominance criteria
are basically linear combinations of averages, the hypotheses can be tested using a simple
two-sample test. Since the test has to be performed over the whole illfare domain, it can
be concluded that distribution A dominates distribution B in a statistically significant
manner if H0 is rejected for each value of x within the illfare domain at the chosen level of
significance. The test statistics for the whole procedure suggested by Kaur et al. (1994) is
consequently:
tmax =max
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∆Sˆ(x)√
Vˆ (SA(x)) + Vˆ (SB(x))
RRRRRRRRRRRRRR
x ∈ [ω−, zL+] ∪ [zU−, ω+]⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ (56)
where V (SA(x)) is the variance of SA(x). Dominance is thus observed if tmax is less than
the critical value of the standardized normal distribution corresponding to the chosen level
of significance.
In spite of its appeal, the procedure is empirically not tractable unless distributions are
censored at their tails as noted by Davidson and Duclos (2012). Indeed most observed dis-
tributions are likely to show F (ω−) = 0 or F (ω+) = 0 which yields ∆S(x) = 0. In that case,
estimating tmax systematically results in the non-rejection of H0. As shown by Davidson
and Duclos (2012) for first order dominance tests, while censoring may a priori be at odds
with the core axiomatic framework of poverty measurement, especially the strong ver-
sions of MON, there are valuable reasons for performing such censoring. From a practical
point of view, censoring may be necessary as stochastic dominance procedures are highly
sensitive to the presence of outliers: small measurement errors at the tails of the distribu-
tion may yield a non-dominance result though dominance should objectively be concluded.
From an ethical point of view, it can be said that there are some thresholds at the two tails
of Ω under and above which deprivation is total. For instance, consider two overweight
persons with severe mobility impairment thereby exhibiting limited social interaction and
high risk of premature death. If these two individuals are plainly identical except that
the first one is 5kg lighter than the second one, hence resulting in a lower value of the
BMI, we could reasonably argue that the BMI difference is not worth reflecting into even
a marginal difference with respect to their individual poverty evaluation. Such individu-
als ought not to be dropped from the compared sample but to be treated as if they were
exactly at the corresponding threshold of complete deprivation.
Censoring is thus a statistical necessity for Kaur et al.’s (1994) testing approach when
the information regarding the tails of the observed distribution is limited. However, it is
worth stressing that it may conflict with the transfer axiom as it induces non-convexities
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of π at the censoring thresholds. Instead of having to choose between statistical robustness
and the transfer axiom, it is possible to adopt a lexicographic approach and assume that
the arguments in favour of censoring prevails over those that support the transfer axiom.
In other words, we can presume that axiom TRA holds only for a limited part of the illfare
domain. Indeed, regarding “loss” (“excess”) illfare, if deprivation is total below (above)
some threshold cL ∈]ω−, zL[ (cL ∈]zU , ω+[), we will thus assume that progressive transfers
only have an illfare decreasing effect if the two pre-transfer values of the attribute are
within the interval [cL, zL] ([zU , cU ]). This is equivalent as defining the transfer axiom
with respect to gaps (as in Lambert and Zoli, 2012, for instance) and assume that gap
functions reach an upper limit at the censoring threshold.
Although that position is debatable from an ethical point of view, in practice restricted
dominance procedures only entail a light censoring. Davidson (2009), for instance, indi-
cates that, for restricted dominance procedures at any order to be performed, one only
needs to censor the smallest and largest values of the joint sample of the two distribu-
tions to be compared. So, in practice, censoring means a very light infringement on the
traditional axiomatic framework.
5 Empirical illustration: Child health poverty in Bangladesh,
Colombia and Egypt
5.1 Data and estimation details
We compute poverty measures for weight-for-age of children (0 to 59months old) in Bangladesh,
Colombia, and Egypt; three large developing countries in South Asia, Latin America, and
North Africa. The datasets are: the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
for 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007; the Colombia DHS for 1986, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010; and
the Egypt DHS for 1988, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008. The DHS have detailed health
and anthropometric information for women in child-bearing age and their children, but
not for men. Our illustration focuses on under-five children taking advantage of the fact
that the range of biologically plausible values for most child health indicators has been
defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). Table 1 shows the respective sample
sizes for the three countries’ datasets. The computations were performed using household
weights and accounting for the clustered and stratified sampling design. Some surveys,
e.g. the Bangladesh 2007 DHS, do not have an explicit strata variable, but we generated
it as the interaction between region and urban/rural area because that is how strata were
defined in other surveys.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Our illfare evaluations of children rely on the z-scores of weight-for-age, which are com-
puted using the WHO software (available at: http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/
(2011)). The underweight and overweight lines are -2 and 2, corresponding to moderate
underweight and moderate overweight. The weight-for-age values for ω− and ω+, respec-
tively -6 and 5, are taken from the WHO, which regards them as biologically implausible
(see http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/readme_stata.pdf).
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We did not estimate other available anthropometric indicators for children due to con-
ceptual problems. For instance, while a low height-for-age may reflect malnutrition, a
very high height-for-age does not reflect problems attributable to the family or economic
environment. Rather it may reflect rare, if potentially detrimental, genetic endowments.
Weight-for-height and BMI are not good indicators of health wellbeing among children
because a badly malnourished child may be both too short and too thin for his/her age,
thereby potentially attaining a deceitfully healthy value for indicators of weight by height.
5.2 Estimation results
5.2.1 Bangladesh
[Insert Table 2 here.]
Table 2 shows the illfare estimates for Bangldeshi children using weight-for-age and
members of the FGT family (equation 6) assuming an equal weight for “shortfall” and “ex-
cess” forms of illfare (i.e. β = 1). The top third shows headcount indices, i.e. FGT1,0,0. The
results show a steady decrease in total illfare in Bangladesh between 1997 and 2011, which
relents between 2000 and 2007. The decrease is led by a parallel decrease in “shortfall”
illfare that is consistent with the results obtained by Stevens et al. (2012). By contrast,
“excess” illfare has first decreased (between 1997 and 2000) and then increased (between
2000 and 2011) during the same period. These observations are consistent with Shafilque
et al. (2007) that showed that Bangladesh experienced the same nutrition transition as
the majority of developing countries; namely, the coexistence of both decreasing undernu-
trition and increasing obesity. The overall result exhibits improvement since “shortfall”
illfare in Bangladesh is a more prevalent problem among children. Indeed, Table 3 shows
that undernourishment explains at least 99% of the overall headcount index. Thereupon
the low values for “excess” illfare using FGT1,1,1 and FGT1,2,2 are unsurprising (see bottom
two-thirds of Table 2 and respective contributions in Table 3).
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Both FGT1,1,1 and FGT1,2,2 have decreased for “shortfall” illfare among children (bot-
tom two-thirds of middle column in Table 2). Hence, given the small contributions for “ex-
cess” illfare, the period 1997–2011 has witnessed improvement in the intensity of health-
related poverty among children in Bangladesh.
5.2.2 Colombia
[Insert Table 4 here.]
[Insert Table 5 here.]
Table 4 shows the respective illfare estimates for Colombian children. The headcount
results show a steady decrease in total illfare in Colombia between 1986 and 2010, without
relenting. Compared to Bangladesh, this decrease starts from a lower base of total illfare
in their respective initial accounting periods. The decrease is led by a parallel decrease in
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“shortfall” illfare. By contrast, “excess” illfare has increased during the same period (albeit
with a lull from 2000 to 2005). The overall result exhibits improvement since “shortfall”
illfare in Colombia is also relatively a more prevalent problem among children. Indeed, Ta-
ble 5 shows that undernourishment explains at least 60% of the overall headcount index.
Thereupon the low values for “excess” illfare using FGT1,1,1 and FGT1,2,2 are unsurprising
(see bottom two-thirds of Table 4 and respective contributions in Table 5).
Both FGT1,1,1 and FGT1,2,2 have decreased for “shortfall” illfare among children (bot-
tom two-thirds of middle column in Table 4), whereas the same indices show no distinct
pattern for “excess” illfare (bottom two-thirds of rightmost column in Table 4). In both
cases, of “shortfall” and “excess”, the gaps and square gaps tend to be small, in particular
the “shortfall” gaps in Colombia are much smaller than in Bangladesh, signalling a dis-
tribution with fewer extreme observations. As for “excess” illfare gaps, while small, their
contribution toward total illfare measures has increased throughout the years (two right-
most columns in Table 5). Still the “excess” contribution is below 50%, which helps explain
why the steady reduction “shortfall” gaps and squared gaps brought about corresponding
reductions in the intensity of overall health-related illfare among children in Colombia
during the period 1986-2010.
5.2.3 Egypt
[Insert Table 6 here.]
[Insert Table 7 here.]
Table 6 shows the illfare estimates for Egyptian children. Unlike the previous cases of
Bangladesh and Colombia, Egypt’s headcount results do not show a steady decrease trend
in total illfare during the 1988-2008 period. The headcount fluctuates: first increases, then
decreases during the 1990s and then goes up again during the last decade. These fluctua-
tions in total illfare are not perfectly matched by similar behaviours in either “shortfall” or
“excess” illfare, because the two components move in opposite directions between 1988 and
2000. By contrast, from 2000 onward the two measures are synchronized: both increase
leading to a corresponding increase in the total illfare headcount. By 2008, total illfare
in Egypt is slightly below the 1988 level, mainly due to a net decline in “shortfall” illfare,
whereas “excess” illfare exhibits a net increase at the end.
The fluctuating patterns in the headcount are also reflected for both forms of illfare
in their respective FGT1,1,1 and FGT1,2,2 measures (bottom two-thirds of middle column
in Table 6). In general the “shortfall” gaps and squared gaps of Egypt are between those
of Bangladesh and Colombia; whereas the “excess” gaps in Egypt tend to be the high-
est among the three countries (with Bangladesh featuring the lowest “excess” gaps and
squared gaps). From 2000 FGT1,1,1 increased steadily in Egypt, due to parallel increases
in both “shortfall” and “excess” gaps. Between the two end-points, 1988 and 2008, the in-
tensity of “shortfall” illfare experienced a net decrease in Egypt, whereas “excess” illfare
moved in the opposite direction.
As a consequence of these trends, the relative importance of “shortfall” illfare among
Egyptian children has declined substantially, in terms of the three FGT indices in Table 7).
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While the trend has not been monotonic, it is noteworthy that in 1998 “shortfall” illfare
contributed more than 90% of the three indices, whereas by 2008 “shortfall” illfare was not
more than 61% of total illfare among Egyptian children. Moreover, it explained less than
half of the total square gap index.
5.3 Ethical robustness tests
5.3.1 Test results
The results of the previous section are very informative about trends in child health-
related illfare in Bangladesh, Colombia and Egypt. However they depend on particular
choices of “shortfall” and “excess” deprivation lines, as well as of functional forms for the
illfare indices. According to the most recent DHS for each country, total illfare, as mea-
sured by FGT1,0,0, FGT1,1,1, and FGT1,2,2, was more serious in Bangladesh, followed by
Egypt, and then by Colombia. How robust are these results? Likewise total illfare de-
creased in the three countries from their first DHS to their most recent one, respectively.
Are these improvements robust to different measurement choices? In this section we ap-
ply the dominance conditions from above propositions in order to answer these questions.
We perform a cross-country robustness test based on each country’s most recent DHS (i.e.
2011 for Bangladesh, 2010 for Colombia, and 2008 for Egypt); and then we perform three
within-country robustness tests in which the initial DHS distribution of each country is
compared against its most recent DHS distribution (e.g. 1997 versus 2011 in the case of
Bangladesh).
[Insert Table 8 here.]
Table 8 shows the dominance results for the three cross-country comparisons. Each row
shows test results for the dominance condition of a different proposition. The columns refer
to the comparisons, e.g. "Colombia versus Bangladesh". The symbol ∅ denotes violation of
one or more dominance conditions in a proposition, which necessarily means the absence
of robust comparisons according to that proposition. "Colombia ≼ Egypt" means that the
condition is fulfilled and that "Colombia" dominates "Egypt" (i.e. by exhibiting less illfare
for a respective class of indices). However the condition is statistically significant at the
chosen level of 5% only if the symbol appears with a star, i.e. ≼∗ (otherwise we do not reject
the null hypothesis ∆S(x) = 0). Following the arguments of Davidson and Duclos (2012)
presented above, we test the conditions in a restricted domain delimited by the second
lowest and second largest values of the joined sample of the two compared distributions.
For the conditions related to independent deprivation lines (Propositions 7 and 8) we let:[zL−, zL+] = [−2.1,−1.9] and [zU−, zU+] = [1.9,2.1].
Table 8 shows that only the illfare comparison between Colombia and Egypt is robust,
with statistical significance, to any different choices of deprivation line or functional form
within the classes Π1 or the narrower Π2. By contrast, the other two pairwise comparisons
are not robust unless further restrictions are imposed on the range of admissible illfare
indices. For instance, the comparison between Colombia and Bangladesh is robust to a
wide range of illfare indices and deprivation lines if the two forms of illfare are compara-
ble in the way stipulated by members of the classes Π˜1 and Π˜2, that is when priority is
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given to “shortfall” illfare reduction. This is apparent in the fulfilment of the conditions in
Propositions 3a and 4a in favour of Colombia. Likewise Colombia dominates Bangladesh
in all the other conditions involving combinations of independent and linked deprivation
lines, absolute and relative gaps, and first and second order dominance (related to the TRA
axiom). However the relative-gaps conditions are not fulfilled with statistical significance.
Meanwhile the comparison between Bangladesh and Egypt is only robust (and with
statistical significance), favouring Egypt for the conditions from Propositions 3a, 4a, 7a,
and 8a i.e. for the cases of comparable deprivations through absolute gaps, and either
linked or independent deprivation lines.7
[Insert Table 9 here.]
Table 9 shows the dominance results fort the within-country comparison. For each
country the two end-points for which we have DHS data are compared. Interestingly, we
only find robust illfare comparisons if the same restrictions on the functional forms of the
illfare indices are imposed across countries; namely those pertaining to the conditions of
Propositions 3a, 4a, 7a and 8a. This means that we can robustly conclude that total illfare
declined in the three countries if we consider only illfare indices which regard “shortfall”
illfare as more serious than “excess” illfare and we establish the comparability between the
two forms of illfare using absolute gaps. More specifically, these comparisons are robust
for linked deprivation lines and for independent deprivation lines. However, as Table 9
shows, not all dominance results are statistically significant.8
5.3.2 Graphical illustration of the dominance conditions
Besides proper testing, the dominance conditions proposed above can also be illustrated
graphically. Figure 4 shows four examples of the actual conditions each surrounded by 95%
confidence intervals. The top left panel shows the conditions of Proposition 1 for the com-
parison between Egypt and Colombia, where Egypt plays the role of country "A", Colombia
is country "B", and all statistics measuring differences are expressed following the form:
∆S = SA − SB (as used above). The vertical axis measures differences in either cumula-
tive distributions or survival functions and the horizontal axis displays the values of the
weight-for-age scores. The curve mapping from the left of a score of -2 is the difference
between the two cumulative distributions following condition (11) in Proposition 1. By
contrast, the curve mapping from the right of a score of 2 is the difference between the two
survival functions which is an alternative way of presenting condition (12). Clearly, Egypt
exhibits higher cumulative distributions below x = −2 and also higher survival functions
above x = 2. Therefore, as we know from Table 8, Colombia dominates Egypt according to
Proposition 1.
The top right panel shows the conditions of Proposition 1 for the comparison between
Bangladesh and Colombia, where Bangladesh plays the role of "A" and, again, Colombia
7 The uncensored dominance results for the cross-country comparisons are qualitatively identical, but not
statistically significant. These are available upon request.
8 The uncensored dominance results for the within-country comparisons only yield dominance relationships
in the case of Egypt for comparable deprivations based on absolute gaps. All the other possibilities yield curve
crossings. Results are available upon request.
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represents "B". Again, to the left of x = −2 the line is the difference in cumulative distribu-
tion functions, whereas to the right of x = 2 the line is the difference in survival functions.
Hence, unlike the previous panel, the illustration clearly depicts a situation of lack of dom-
inance according to Proposition 1. The panel shows what we know from previous results:
that Bangladesh suffers from higher incidence of malnutrition, but Colombia is more af-
fected by child obesity. Hence unless we impose comparability criteria between the two
forms of illfare, we cannot rank the two countries in terms of total child illfare.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
The bottom left panel shows the conditions of Proposition 1 for the comparison in
Bangladesh between 1997 and 2011, where the situation in 2011 plays the role of "A"
and 1997 represents "B". Note then that condition (11) is fulfilled indicating a robust de-
crease in “shortfall” illfare during the period. However condition (12) is not fulfilled in
the same direction, in fact the difference in the survival functions is very slim. Hence the
panel illustrate an already known result: that the apparent reduction in total illfare in
Bangladesh between 1997 and 2011 is not robust to any measurement choices from the
broadest class Π1.
Finally, the bottom right panel shows the conditions of Proposition 7a for the compar-
ison in Egypt between 1988 and 2008, where the situation in 2008 acts as "A" and 1988
replaces "B".9 Here, we allowed the “shortfall” and “excess” illfare threshold to vary freely
within the respective intervals [−2.1,−1.9] and [1.9,2.1]. The line to the left of x = −1.9
is now the statistic of condition (40), and the line to the right of x = 1.9 is the statistic of
condition (41). Since both have to be non-positive for "A" to dominate "B", it is clear from
the panel that, according to Proposition 7a, the decline in total illfare in Egypt during the
period was robust to different measurement choices within the class Π˜1 with independent
deprivation lines, as we know from the previous section.
6 Conclusion
Assessing human progress in health outcomes has a long history. The recent consensual
recognition of poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon has prompted the use of poverty
measurement tools to assess the extent of deprivation within the health dimension of well-
being. However, contrary to traditional applications in monetary poverty, health indicators
are likely to be related to wellbeing in a non-monotonic manner, so that individuals may
suffer from either too low or too high levels of such variables. Providing a synthetic index
for health-related illfare that can fully take into account the dual burden of, say, undernu-
trition and obesity, is thus a challenge that deserves consideration.
In the present paper, we proposed some alterations of traditional poverty measure-
ment axioms in order to propose health-related illfare indices that are consistent with
9 In this specific case, the confidence interval for the dominance curve on the the “excess” domain could not
be computed using formulas presented in section 4 for the estimation of the standard error due to the presence
of the max operator in function ϕ. Consequently, the confidence interval was estimated non-parametrically
using a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 replications.
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non-monotonic wellbeing relationships. Moreover, we provide dominance criteria to as-
sess the ethical robustness of health-related illfare orderings, considering broad classes of
illfare indices based on some reasonable assumptions and admissible ranges for the de-
privation lines. Further developments should include the development of dominance tech-
nique when such non-monotonic relationships occur in a multidimensional framework, for
instance when information on income, education or access to basic services are added to
health variables in order to get a more comprehensive picture of illfare.
Finally, the usefulness of our indices and stochastic dominance tests is illustrated us-
ing DHS datasets from Bangladesh, Colombia, and Egypt, three large developing coun-
tries from South Asia, Latin America, and North Africa, respectively. More specifically,
nutrition-related illfare for children is assessed using z-scores of weight-for-age for under-
five children. We show inter alia that the apparent declines in nutrition-related illfare for
young children, during the respective periods of each country, are only robust when we
restrict the class of admissible illfare indices to those which deem “shortfall” illfare more
serious than “excess” illfare. Otherwise, since the observed increase in the incidence of
obesity among children in the three countries is bound to act as a counterweight to the
downward trends in malnutrition, any final judgment of improvement in illfare relies too
sensitively on the choices of functional form for the illfare index and deprivation lines.
Likewise, we show that only the contemporaneous comparison of Colombia against Egypt
is fully robust to any illfare index satisfying our key desirable properties; whereas, by
contrast, the other two comparisons are only robust, again, when we restrict the domain
of admissible illfare functions to those which place a higher negative welfare effect on
“shortfall” illfare.
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Appendices
A Proof of dominance conditions
For the sake of simplicity, demonstrations are performed assuming that the function π(s)(x; zL, zU )
is everywhere differentiable with respect to x on the considered interval. Extending the
demonstration to the case where π(s)(x; zL, zU ) is not differentiable at some points is
straightforward.10
A.1 Proposition 1
Let ∆P ∶= PA − PB be the difference between the statistics (e.g. P , or F ) of populations A
and B. Then note that equation (4) for the difference ∆P can be expressed as:
∆P (zL, zU ) = ∫ a
ω−
π(x; zL, zU )∆f(x)dx + ∫ ω+
a
π(x; zL, zU )∆f(x)dx. (57)
where f is the density function and a ∈]zL, zU [. Integrating by parts each term in equa-
tion (57), we obtain:
∆P (zL, zU ) = [π(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)]a
ω−
− ∫
a
ω−
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx
+ [π(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)]ω+
a
− ∫
ω+
a
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx. (58)
By assumption π(a; zL, zU ) = 0 and ∆F (ω−) = ∆F (ω+) = 0. Noting that in univariate
settings F (x) = 1 − F (x) and therefore ∆F (x) = −∆F(x), we obtain:
∆P (zL, zU ) = −∫ a
ω−
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx − ∫ ω+
a
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx, (59)
= −∫
a
ω−
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx + ∫ ω+
a
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx. (60)
Sufficiency follows by inspection. For necessity let’s consider the case where π(1) is
equal to zero at each point within the illfare domain except x˜.11 Then it can easily be seen
that for ∆P ⩽ 0 given the restrictions on the sign of π(1) it is necessary to have ∆F (x˜) ⩽ 0
if x˜ < zL and ∆F (x˜) ⩽ 0 if x˜ > zU .
A.2 Proposition 2
Keeping in mind that ∂G
∂x
= −F (x), integrating equation (60) by parts yields:
∆P (zL, zU ) = − [π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)]a
ω−
+ ∫
a
ω−
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx
10 See for instance Duclos and Makdissi (2004).
11 For instance, assuming x˜ < zL we can consider the function:
π˜(x;zL, zU) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ε if x ⩽ x˜
ε + x˜ − x if x ∈]x˜, x˜ + ε]
0 if x ∈]x˜ + ε, zL] ∨ x ⩾ zU
(61)
with ε → 0.
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− [π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)]ω+
a
+ ∫
ω+
a
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx, (62)
= ∫
a
ω−
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx + ∫ ω+
a
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx. (63)
since π(1)(a; zL, zU ) = 0 and ∆G(ω−) = ∆G(ω+) = 0. Sufficiency follows by inspection. For
necessity let consider the case where π(2) is equal to zero at each point within the illfare
domain except x˜ where π(2)(x˜; zL, zU ) > 0. It then can easily be seen that for ∆P ⩽ 0 given
the restrictions on the sign of π(2) it is necessary to have∆G(x˜) ⩽ 0 if x˜ < zL and ∆G(x˜) ⩽ 0
if x˜ > zU . Now, given that ∆G(x) and ∆G(x) are continuous by construction, the above
conditions can be extended to include the deprivation lines zL and zU , leading respectively
to conditions 14 and 15 in proposition 2.12
B Proof of sequential dominance conditions
B.1 Proof of Propositions 3 and 5
First we prove the parts of the propositions pertaining to absolute gaps.
Let the second element of the right-hand side of (60) be written in terms of variable
y, so that we have:∫ ω
+
a π
(1)(y; zL, zU )∆F (y)dy. Then, remembering that: y = zL + zU − x
(therefore dy = −dx), ∆F (x) = −∆F(x), and ∫ ba f(x)dx = −∫ ab f(x)dx, we can rewrite (60)
the following way:
∆P (zL, zU ) = −∫ a
ω−
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆F (zL + zU− x)dx. (64)
In the case zL+ − ω− ⩾ ω+ − zU−, equation (64) can be expressed as:
∆P (zL, zU ) = −∫ zL+zU−ω+
ω−
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx
− ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
(π(1)(x; zL, zU ) + (1 − 1)π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆F (x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆F (zL + zU− x)dx, (65)
= −∫
zL+zU−ω+
ω−
π(1)(x; zL, zU )∆F (x)dx
− ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
(π(1)(x; zL, zU ) + π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆F (x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) (∆F (zL + zU− x) +∆F (x)) dx. (66)
By assumption, π(1)(x; zL, zU ) + π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈ [zL + zU − ω+, a].
In the case zL+ − ω− ⩽ ω+ − zU−, equation (64) can be expressed as:
∆P (zL, zU ) = −∫ a
ω−
(π(1)(x; zL, zU ) + (1 − 1)π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆F (x)dx
+ ∫
ω−
zL+zU−ω+
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆F (zL + zU− x)dx
12We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
31
B PROOF OF SEQUENTIAL DOMINANCE CONDITIONS
+ ∫
a
ω−
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆F (zL + zU− x)dx, (67)
= −∫
a
ω−
(π(1)(x; zL, zU ) + π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆F (x)dx
+ ∫
ω−
zL+zU−ω+
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆F (zL + zU− x)dx
+ ∫
a
ω−
π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) (∆F (zL + zU− x) +∆F (x)) dx. (68)
By assumption, π(1)(x; zL, zU ) + π(1)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) ⩽ 0 ∀x ∈ [ω−, a].
In both cases, sufficiency follows by inspection. For necessity, we can use the same
approach as for Proposition 1. The proof for the parts of the propositions pertaining to
relative gaps (the "b" parts) follows the same reasoning.
B.2 Proof of Propositions 4 and 6
First we prove the parts of the propositions pertaining to absolute gaps. Considering mem-
bers from Π˜2(zL+, zU−), we first can rewrite equation (63) as:
∆P (zL, zU ) = ∫ a
ω−
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
π(2)(zL + zU − x; zL, zU )∆G(zL + zU − x)dx. (69)
In the case zL+ − ω− ⩾ ω+ − zU−, equation (69) can be expressed as:
∆P (zL, zU ) = ∫ zL+zU−ω+
ω−
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
(π(2)(x; zL, zU ) + (1 − 1)π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆G(zL + zU− x)dx, (70)
= ∫
zL+zU−ω+
ω−
π(2)(x; zL, zU )∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
(π(2)(x; zL, zU ) − π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
a
zL+zU−ω+
π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) (∆G(zL + zU− x) +∆G(x)) dx. (71)
By assumption, π(2)(x; zL, zU ) − π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) ⩾ 0 ∀x ∈ [zL + zU − ω+, zL].
In the case zL+ − ω− ⩽ ω+ − zU−, equation (69) can be expressed as:
∆P (zL, zU ) = ∫ a
ω−
(π(2)(x; zL, zU ) + (1 − 1)π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
ω−
zL+zU−ω+
π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆G(zL + zU− x)dx
+ ∫
a
ω−
π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆G(zL + zU− x)dx, (72)
= ∫
a
ω−
(π(2)(x; zL, zU ) − π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ))∆G(x)dx
+ ∫
ω−
zL+zU−ω+
π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU )∆G(zL + zU− x)dx
+ ∫
a
ω−
π(2)(zL + zU− x; zL, zU ) (∆G(zL + zU− x) +∆G(x)) dx. (73)
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By assumption, π(2)(x; zL, zU ) − π(2)(zL + zU − x; zL, zU ) ⩾ 0 ∀x ∈ [ω−, zL]. Sufficiency
follows by inspection. For necessity, we can use the same approach as for Proposition 2.
The proof for the parts of the propositions pertaining to relative gaps (the "b" parts) follows
the same reasoning.
B.3 Proofs of Propositions 7 and 8
The proofs are inspired by Lambert and Zoli (2005).
B.3.1 Absolute gaps
We first derive the formula for the appropriate interval of y, i.e. Λ(x). For a given set
of poverty lines zL, zU , the value y within the “shortfall” illfare domain that yields the
same gap as x is: y = zL + zU − x. Since zL ∈ [zL−, zL+] and zU ∈ [zU−, zU+], then it is
natural that the bottom boundary of the interval be zL− + zU− − x. However the constraint
y ⩾ ω− must be respected by definition. Therefore the bottom boundary of the interval
is: max{ω−, zL− + zU− − x}. Likewise, it is natural that the top boundary be of the form:
zL+ + zU+ − x. However the constraint y ⩽ zL+ must also be respected. Therefore the top
boundary of the interval is: zL+ +min{0, zU+ − x}.
Thus we get the general expression for the appropriate interval for y, that is Λ(x) =[max{ω−, zL− + zU− − x}, zL+ −max{0, x − zU+}].
The rest of the proof is straightforward. Since by definition ϕ1(x) is the largest value of
FA(t)−FB(t) for t ∈ Λ(x), we necessarily have FA(x)−FB(x)+FA(y)−FB(y) ⩽ 0 ∀y ∈ Λ(x)
if F
A(x) − FB(x) + ϕ1(x) ⩽ 0. The same line of reasoning yields Proposition 8.
B.3.2 Relative gaps
The formula for the appropriate interval of y, namely Λr(x), is derived with the same
procedure as in the case of absolute gaps, but noting that, for a given set of poverty lines
zL, zU , the value y within the “shortfall” illfare domain that yields the same gap as x
is: y = zL − x−zU
ω+−zU
(zL − ω−). Since y is an increasing function of both poverty lines, then
the natural bottom and top intervals are, respectively: zL− − x−zU−
ω+−zU−
(zL− − ω−) and zL+ −
x−zU+
ω+−zU+
(zL+ − ω−). However, in this case the constraint y ⩾ ω− is always fulfilled since:
zL− − x−zU−
ω+−zU−
(zL− − ω−) ⩾ ω− ∀x ⩽ ω+. By contrast, the constraint that y ⩽ zL+ must be
imposed. Therefore the general expression for the appropriate interval for y is: Λr(x) =[zL− − x−zU−
ω+−zU−
(zL− − ω−), zL+ −max{0, x−zU+
ω+−zU+
(zL+ − ω−)}].
The rest of the proof proceeds as in the case of absolute gaps.
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Figure 1: Comparability of the deprivations: absolute and relative gaps.
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Figure 4: Illustrations of dominance conditions for distributions of
weight-for-age in under-5 children.
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Table 1: DHS sample sizes
Country Year Children (0-59 months old)
1997 5,600
2000 5,558
Bangladesh 2004 7,055
2007 6,378
2011 7,649
1986 1,320
1995 4,520
Colombia 2000 4,198
2005 12,419
2010 15,988
1988 2,029
1992 7,361
Egypt 1995 10,299
2000 10,343
2005 12,364
2008 18,970
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Table 2: Nutrition-related illfare (weight-for-age): Bangladeshi children,
1997-2011.
Year Total illfare “Shortfall” illfare “Excess” illfare
Headcount index (FGT1,0,0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1997
0.522 0.520 0.002
[0.010] [0.010] [0.0007]
2000
0.412 0.411 0.001
[0.009] [0.009] [0.0003]
2004
0.424 0.422 0.002
[0.010] [0.010] [0.0006]
2007
0.419 0.415 0.003
[0.009] [0.009] [0.0009]
2011
0.361 0.357 0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.0007]
Illfare gap index (FGT1,1,1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1997
0.125 0.1245 0.0006
[0.003] [0.003] [0.0002]
2000
0.0839 0.0838 0.00009
[0.003] [0.003] [0.000]
2004
0.0849 0.0846 0.0003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.00001]
2007
0.0795 0.0786 0.0009
[0.003] [0.003] [0.0003]
2011
0.0686 0.0674 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0003]
Squared illfare gap index (FGT1,2,2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1997
0.0470 0.0468 0.0002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0001]
2000
0.0274 0.0274 0.0000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
2004
0.0271 0.0270 0.0001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
2007
0.0252 0.0248 0.0004
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0002]
2011
0.0213 0.0207 0.0006
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0002]
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 3: Contributions of “shortfall” illfare to total weight-for-age illfare:
Bangladeshi children, 1997-20011.
Year FGT1,0,0 FGT1,1,1 FGT1,2,2
1997 99.5% 99.5% 99.6%
2000 99.8% 99.9% 99.9%
2004 99.5% 99.7% 99.8%
2007 99.2% 98.9% 98.4%
2011 99.0% 98.2% 97.3%
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Table 4: Nutrition-related illfare (weight-for-age): Colombian children,
1986-2010.
Year Total illfare “Shortfall” illfare “Excess” illfare
Headcount index (FGT1,0,0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1986
0.095 0.084 0.011
[0.012] [0.012] [0.003]
1995
0.075 0.062 0.013
[0.005] [0.004] [0.002]
2000
0.068 0.049 0.019
[0.004] [0.004] [0.002]
2005
0.065 0.048 0.017
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
2010
0.051 0.032 0.019
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Illfare gap index (FGT1,1,1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1986
0.0141 0.0129 0.0013
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0004]
1995
0.0108 0.0089 0.0019
[0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0003]
2000
0.0102 0.0065 0.0037
[0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0006]
2005
0.0088 0.0060 0.0028
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0003]
2010
0.0077 0.0044 0.0033
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003]
Squared illfare gap index (FGT1,2,2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1986
0.0040 0.0037 0.0003
[0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0002]
1995
0.0030 0.0024 0.0006
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0002]
2000
0.0031 0.0018 0.0012
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003]
2005
0.0023 0.0015 0.0009
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
2010
0.0021 0.0012 0.0009
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001]
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
41
TABLES
Table 5: Contributions of “shortfall” illfare to total weight-for-age illfare:
Colombian children, 1986-2010.
Year FGT1,0,0 FGT1,1,1 FGT1,2,2
1986 88.2% 91.1% 92.5%
1995 82.9% 82.5% 81.2%
2000 72.4% 63.7% 59.7%
2005 73.9% 68.5% 62.6%
2010 62.8% 57.8% 56.1%
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Table 6: Nutrition-related illfare (weight-for-age): Egyptian children, 1988-2008.
Year Total illfare “Shortfall” illfare “Excess” illfare
Headcount index (FGT1,0,0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1988
0.116 0.107 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.002]
1992
0.124 0.073 0.051
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005]
1995
0.123 0.097 0.026
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
2000
0.070 0.036 0.034
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
2005
0.085 0.051 0.034
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
2008
0.094 0.057 0.037
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Illfare gap index (FGT1,1,1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1988
0.0218 0.0205 0.0013
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0006]
1992
0.0267 0.0135 0.0132
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
1995
0.0227 0.0175 0.0052
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0005]
2000
0.0121 0.0052 0.0069
[0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0006]
2005
0.0172 0.0090 0.0082
[0.001] [0.0007] [0.001]
2008
0.0181 0.0094 0.0087
[0.001] [0.0007] [0.0008]
Squared illfare gap index (FGT1,2,2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1988
0.0078 0.0072 0.0006
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0005]
1992
0.0102 0.0045 0.0056
[0.001] [0.0005] [0.0009]
1995
0.0075 0.0057 0.0019
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0003]
2000
0.0039 0.0013 0.0025
[0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0003]
2005
0.0067 0.0031 0.0036
[0.0007] [0.0003] [0.0006]
2008
0.0066 0.0028 0.0038
[0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0005]
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 7: Contributions of “shortfall” illfare to total weight-for-age illfare:
Egyptian children, 1988-2008.
Year FGT1,0,0 FGT1,1,1 FGT1,2,2
1988 91.6% 93.7% 92.0%
1992 59.1% 50.6% 44.5%
1995 78.8% 77.1% 75.0%
2000 51.3% 43.4% 34.5%
2005 59.9% 52.5% 46.3%
2008 60.7% 51.7% 42.8%
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Table 8: Dominance results for cross-country comparisons
Colombia Colombia Bangladesh
vs vs vs
Bangladesh Egypt Egypt
Non comparability, 1st order (Prop. 1) ∅ ≼∗ ∅
Non comparability, 2nd order (Prop. 2) ∅ .. ∅
Linked pov. lines, 1st order, abs. gaps (Prop 3a) ≼∗ ≼∗ ≽∗
Linked pov. lines, 2nd order, abs. gaps (Prop 4a) .. .. ..
Indep pov. lines, 1st order, abs. gaps (Prop 7a) ≼∗ ≼∗ ≽∗
Indep pov. lines, 2nd order, abs. gaps (Prop 8a) .. .. ..
Linked pov. lines, 1st order, rel. gaps (Prop 3b) ≼ ≼∗ ∅
Linked pov. lines, 2nd order, rel. gaps (Prop 4b) ≼ .. ∅
Indep pov. lines, 1st order, rel. gaps (Prop 7b) ≼ ≼∗ ∅
Indep pov. lines, 2nd order, rel. gaps (Prop 8b) ≼ .. ∅∅ denotes violation of one or more dominance conditions in a proposition.≼ (≽) means that the country at the top (bottom) dominates (i.e. shows less illfare).
∗ means that the conditions are statistically significant at 5%.
Second-order tests are not performed when a significant first-order dominance rela-
tionship is observed.
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Table 9: Dominance results for within-country comparisons
Colombia Bangladesh Egypt
1988-2010 1997-2011 1988-2008
Non comparability, 1st order (Prop. 1) ∅ ∅ ∅
Non comparability, 2nd order (Prop. 2) ∅ ∅ ∅
Linked pov. lines, 1st order, abs. gaps (Prop 3a) ≽ ≽∗ ≽
Linked pov. lines, 2nd order, abs. gaps (Prop 4a) ≽ .. ≽
Indep pov. lines, 1st order, abs. gaps (Prop 7a) ≽ ≽∗ ≽∗
Indep pov. lines, 2nd order, abs. gaps (Prop 8a) ≽ .. ..
Linked pov. lines, 1st order, rel. gaps (Prop 3b) ∅ ∅ ∅
Linked pov. lines, 2nd order, rel. gaps (Prop 4b) ∅ ∅ ∅
Indep pov. lines, 1st order, rel. gaps (Prop 7b) ∅ ∅ ∅
Indep pov. lines, 2nd order, rel. gaps (Prop 8b) ∅ ∅ ∅∅ denotes violation of one or more dominance conditions in a proposition.≼ (≽) means that the most recent (the oldest) distribution dominates (i.e. shows less illfare).
∗ means that the conditions are statistically significant at 5%.
Second-order tests are not performed when a significant first-order dominance rela-
tionship is observed.
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